SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS THAT MANDATE SPECIFIC PERSONNEL REDUCTIONS VIOLATE THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE WHERE
THEY INTERFERE WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH AUTHORITY AND Do
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BE-

TWEEN GOVERNMENTAL BRANCH ES-Communications Workers of

America AFL-CIO v. Jim Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 617 A.2d 223
(1992).
In June, 1992, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the 1993
Fiscal Year Appropriations Act (Act), which provided various
state departments with the ability to decrease personnel costs
through staff reductions. 130 NJ. at 444, 617 A.2d at 225. Specifically, the Act authorized transfers of funds within departments
by laying off employees with salaries in excess of $50,000. Id.
(citing the 1993 Appropriations Act, S. 1000, § 1). According to
the Act, unclassified employees would be terminated first. If insufficient, the Act permitted further reductions of classified employees, such as management and administrative personnel,
provided written notice and justification of the action was given
to the Director of the Division of Budget and Accounting
(Budget Director) and the Joint Budget Oversight Committee
(Budget Committee). Section 38 of the Act (section 38) also
stated that "no State Troopers, corrections officers or personnel
providing services in any institution operated by the state" could
be dismissed. Id. (quoting the 1993 Appropriations Act, S. 1000,
§ 38). Moreover, section 38 allowed that "whenever possible"
layoffs had to exclude employees who provided direct services
and career employees occupying the same job for at least five
years, or having ten years of service with the state. Although
New Jersey Governor Jim Florio (Governor) vetoed the Act, the
legislature subsequently overrode his veto.
Later that same month, Senate Bill 996 amended section 38,
adding "communications operators, security guards, alcoholic
beverage control inspectors, and marine police officers" to the
category of employees who could not be discharged. Id. at 44445, 617 A.2d at 225-26. Additionally, the legislature deleted the
discretionary "whenever possible" language and replaced it with
a mandatory provision stating that personnel reductions had to
include "managerial and other exempt personnel outside the collective negotiations units in the unclassified service .... " Id. at
445, 617 A.2d at 226 (citing the 1993 Appropriations Act, S.996,
1205

1206

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1205

§ 1). Among this new group of employees eligible for layoffs
were high-salaried, non-union state workers. Governor Florio
also vetoed Senate Bill 996, claiming the amendment interfered
with the executive branch's constitutional obligation to manage
the government. The legislature, however, again overrode his
veto, and Senate Bill 996 became law.
Responding to the legislature's actions, Governor Florio
sought advice from the state Attorney General regarding the constitutionality of the Act and its amendments. Id. at 445-46, 617
A.2d at 226. In a letter datedJuly 2, 1992, the Attorney General
concluded that the reduction provisions were not unconstitutional under the separation-of-powers doctrine. Id. at 446, 617
A.2d at 226. The Attorney General noted, however, that if the
reduction language dictated the specific staffing decisions to be
made, the provisions would be unconstitutional. Furthermore,
the Attorney General maintained that the categorical exemption
of certain employees could restrict the Governor's ability to operate efficiently the government with a reduced staff. As a result,
the Governor directed his cabinet not to adhere to the provisions
declared unconstitutional by the Attorney General.
In response to the Act, various state departments submitted
proposed layoff plans to the Commissioner of the Department of
Personnel (Commissioner). Rejecting the plans, the Commissioner observed that a disproportionate number of lower-salaried, union employees would be affected. Id., 617 A.2d at 22627. On August 5, 1992, however, the Commissioner approved
all layoff plans that would require terminating 1459 employees
on October 2, 1992. Id. at 446-47, 617 A.2d at 227. Among the
employees to be laid off, approximately 900 were represented by
the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CWA). Id.
at 447, 617 A.2d at 227. The CWA stated that only 450 of the
total were from unclassified or managerial ranks. Additionally,
the CWA asserted that the majority of the targeted workers
earned less than $50,000 per year, and of those, hundreds performed clerical and other functions for an annual salary of less
than $20,000.
Responding to the Attorney General, the Executive Director
of the Office of Legislative Services (Executive Director) wrote to
legislative leaders on the constitutionality of the Act's restrictions. The Executive Director concluded that the legislature
could control certain administrative aspects of the government
related to appropriation or fiscal policy. Id. at 447-48, 617 A.2d
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at 227. The Executive Director reasoned that the Act's restrictions were constitutional because they furthered the legislature's
appropriations powers. Id. at 447, 617 A.2d at 227.
In mid-August, the CWA and Robert W. Pursell filed an action in the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division against Governor Florio, the Commissioner and the State Treasurer Samuel
Crane (defendants). Id. at 448, 617 A.2d at 227. The CWA
sought a judgment that the defendants had violated the Act and
an order directing the defendants to rescind all layoff notices
served on employees who were in violation of the Act. Id. The
law division subsequently transferred part of the complaint to the
appellate division. Id. On September 29, 1992, New Jersey Assemblyman John Hartmann (Hartmann) commenced an action in
the law division against the same defendants in the first action,
and demanded the same relief. Id. On the same day, Hartmann
amended the complaint to join several other Senators and General Assemblymen as plaintiffs (collectively "legislators"). Id. at
448, 617 A.2d at 227-28. On appeal, the legislators' suit was
consolidated with the CWA's action. Id., 617 A.2d at 228.
On October 2, 1992, the CWA filed an application for immediate relief to enjoin the layoffs scheduled for that day. Id. The
appellate division denied the CWA's motion for a stay of the layoffs pending appeal. Id. In response, the plaintiffs filed a motion
to stay with the New Jersey Supreme Court. Id. Justice Handler
granted the stay until October 5, 1992, when the court would
review the appeal. Id. On October 5, 1992, the court granted
certification but vacated the stay of the layoffs. Id. at 448-49, 617
A.2d at 228. On appeal, the state supreme court found that the
Act's layoff provisions, including section 38 and its amendment,
unconstitutionally violated the New Jersey Constitution's separation of powers provision. Id. at 467, 617 A.2d at 237. The court
concluded, however, that the original discretionary "whenever
possible" language of section 38 did not offend the separation of
powers doctrine and therefore was constitutional. Id. at 467-68,
617 A.2d at 237.
Writing for an unanimous court, Justice Garibaldi began
with a discussion of the separation of powers provision in the
New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 449, 617 A.2d at 228 (citing NJ
Const. art. III, para. 1 (1947)). Justice Garibaldi noted that the
separation of powers doctrine is fundamental to the state's government. Id. Since its inception in 1844, the justice explained,
the purpose of the separation of powers principle was to main-
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tain a balance between the branches of government while preserving their independence and integrity and preventing a
concentration of power in any one branch. Id. (citing David v.
Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 326 (1965)). The supreme court recognized, however, that the doctrine of separation required not absolute division, but rather cooperative accommodation among
the three governmental branches. Id. (citations omitted). The
goal of the separation of powers principle, the court posited, was
to guarantee that one branch could not claim or receive an excessive amount of power. Id. at 450, 617 A.2d at 228 (citing Brown v.
Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 11 (1972)).
Having set forth the separation of powers doctrine's constitutional background, the court detailed the party's contentions.
Id. Both the CWA and the legislators, the court noted, averred
that sustaining the defendant's position would give a "blank
check" to the Governor during the appropriations process. Id.
Conversely, the court remarked, the Governor asserted that sustenance of the plaintiff's position would "allow the Legislature to
micromanage the Executive branch." Id. Specifically, Justice
Garibaldi noted the executive branch's assertion that the Act's
amendments unconstitutionally intruded on the Governor's authority to administer funds, make staffing decisions and allocate
resources. Id. at 450, 617 A.2d at 229. The court then conveyed
that both the CWA and the legislators argued that the Act does
not restrict the Governor's choice of layoffs and provides sufficient personnel options for effective functioning. Id. at 451, 617
A.2d at 229.
With those contentions in mind, the supreme court next determined whether the enactment of Senate Bill 996 unconstitutionally infringed upon the Governor's power. Id. To answer
this question, Justice Garibaldi first examined the legislature's
source of authority to appropriate funds. Id. (citing N.J. CONST.
art. IV, § 1, para. 1 (1947); N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 6, para. 1
(1947); N.J. CONST. art VIII, § 2, para. 2 (1947)). The justice reaffirmed that the legislative branch had the exclusive power to
appropriate funds. Id. (citation omitted). Moreover, because the
constitution was silent on the standards and rules of the content
of an appropriation, the court recognized the need for flexibility
and discretion in the appropriations process. Id. at 452, 617
A.2d at 229 (citing Karcher v. Kean, 97 NJ. 483, 491, 479 A.2d
403 (1984)). The supreme court acknowledged, therefore, that
the imposition of conditions, limitations or restrictions on the ex-
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penditure of funds was inherent in the appropriations power. Id.
(citing Karcher, 97 N.J. at 492, 479 A.2d 403). The court clarified,
however, that statutory conditions could not unconstitutionally
infringe upon the separation of powers doctrine. Id.
Justice Garibaldi next reviewed the Governor's power to execute laws. Id. (citing N.J. CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 1 (1947); NJ.
CONST. art. V, § 4, para. 2 (1947)). Among the Governor's powers, the justice stated, was the authority to appoint individuals
serving as department heads under his supervision. Id. Additionally, the court noted the Governor's ability to control departments in which the head is a commission and to investigate
conduct and discipline executive branch officials. Id. at 454, 617
A.2d at 230 (citing N.J. CONST. art. V, § 5, para. 4-5 (1947)). The

court clarified, however, that these powers did not extend into
the legislative or judicial branches. Id. (citation omitted).
The court recognized the Governor's vital constitutional role
in fiscal affairs. Id., 617 A.2d at 230-31 (citation omitted). Specifically, Justice Garibaldi highlighted the Governor's statutory
power to propose budgets and selectively veto appropriations.
Id., 617 A.2d at 231 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27B-20; N.J.
CONST. art. V, § 1, para. 15 (1947)). Granting the Governor significant responsibilities in fiscal affairs, the justice explained, was
not only the goal of the 1947 Constitutional Convention, but also
necessary for the executive branch to function efficiently. Id. at
254-55, 617 A.2d at 231 (citations omitted). The justice further
emphasized the Governor's power to execute faithfully the laws
and the constitution's aim to build a strong executive branch
without encroaching on the privileges of the legislative and judicial branches. Id. at 455, 456, 617 A.2d at 231 (citing Kenny v.
Byrne, 144 N.J. Super. 243, 365 A.2d 211 (App. Div. 1976), aff'd,
75 N.J. 458, 383 A.2d 428 (1978)).
Justice Garibaldi next set forth the basic principles governing the constitutionality of legislation that may violate the
separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 256, 617 A.2d at 232. The
justice first stressed that similar to all legislative enactments, the
validity of paragraph 38 is presumed. Id. Moreover, the court
declared that the legislature may appropriate funds and attach
restrictions or conditions to those appropriations. Id. (citing
Karcher, 97 NJ. at 491-92, 479 A.2d 403). The court warned,
however, that the separation of powers principle limited the authority to restrict appropriations. Id. The Governor, not the legislature, the court postulated, has sole control over the personnel
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and resources of all executive branch departments. Id. Thus,
although deference must normally be given to the legislature, the
court required careful review where one governmental branch
encroaches on the power of another. Id. at 457, 617 A.2d at 232.
Addressing the constitutionality of the Act's amendments
first under Senate Bill 996, Justice Garibaldi examined two similar cases that established the appropriate test. Id. First, the justice considered General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d
438 (1972), in which the court struck down as violative of the
separation of powers doctrine, the Legislative Oversight Act, an
enactment granting the legislature veto power over proposed
state agency rules by a concurrent resolution of both the Senate
and General Assembly. Id. (citing General Assembly v. Byrne, 90

N.J. at 378, 448 A.2d 438). The court in that case, the justice
noted, reasoned that although not all veto provisions are unconstitutional, the Legislative Oversight Act excessively interfered
with the role of the executive branch and impeded its ability to
faithfully execute the law. Id. (citing General Assembly v. Byrne, 90
N.J. at 378, 448 A.2d 438). Conversely, Justice Garibaldi pointed
out that in Enourato v. New Jersey Building Authority, 90 N.J. 396,

448 A.2d 449 (1972), the court upheld a statute that permitted a
legislative veto of all actions taken by the New Jersey Building
Authority, a state-created agency that built and operated office
space. Id. The legislative veto provisions in Enourato, the court
noted, were sufficiently limited to accommodate the constitutional requirements of separation of powers principles. Id.
Comparing the two cases, the court noted that the major difference in the courts' holdings was due to the nature and scope
of each legislative veto provision's infringement on the executive
branch. Id. at 458, 617 A.2d at 232. The test for violations of the
separation of powers doctrine, the court enunciated, was whether
cooperation between governmental branches advances the substantive purposes of the legislation and presents no significant
possibility of intrusion with the exclusive function of another
branch. Id. at 460, 617 A.2d at 234. Therefore, the court explained, an unconstitutional separation of powers violation will
occur where shared authority is unnecessary for statutory implementation, or where legislative action threatens to interfere with
another branch's exclusive functions. Id. The court deemed this
to have been the case in General Assembly, but not in Enourato. Id.

at 458-59, 617 A.2d at 233.
Applying these principles, Justice Garibaldi found that the
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legislature could reduce appropriations for operating the state
government. Id. The court pronounced, however, that legislative control over the manner of achieving personnel reductions
not only was unnecessary for execution of the Act's scheme, but
seriously interfered with the Governor's power and ability to execute his constitutionally-delegated duties. Id. at 461, 617 A.2d at
234. Staffing decisions, the justice maintained, remained the
core of the executive's daily administrative functions. Id. The
court declared that restricting the Governor's discretion on personnel decisions would prevent the executive branch from utilizing its experience to make reductions by the least disruptive
means. Id. As a result, the court opined, the Governor would be
incapable of exercising his duty to faithfully execute the laws. Id.
Moreover, the court refuted the plaintiff's contention that
the legislature could also hamper the daily operation of executive
agencies by refusing to fund them altogether. Id. Although the
court admitted the truth of this assertion, Justice Garibaldi
pointed to the difference between "the power to appropriate - a
legislative function - and the power to expend the appropriated
funds, an executive function." Id. at 461-62, 617 A.2d at 234 (citing In re Karcher, 190 NJ. Super. 197, 213, 462 A.2d 1273 (App.
Div. 1983), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, Karcher, 97 NJ. 483, 479 A.2d

403 (1984) (further quotation omitted)). While the legislature
may shape the size of government through appropriations, the
court warned, it may not control how those appropriations are
expended by specifying who should not be laid off. Id. at 462,
617 A.2d at 235. The court reasoned that the Act's amendments
both regulated internal administration of the executive branch
and overrode its authority to perform its own functions. Id. at
459, 462-63, 617 A.2d at 235 (citing Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J.
240, 74 A.2d 406, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950)). Furthermore, like GeneralAssembly v. Byrne, the court proffered, the legislature was attempting to implement the law in the manner in
which it sought fit. Id. at 463, 617 A.2d at 235. Justice Garibaldi
noted that regardless of which reduction plan was better - the
Governor's or the Legislators' - the constitution forbade the
legislature from dictating how appropriated funds will be expended. Id. at 463, 464, 617 A.2d at 235, 236. The court found,
therefore, that Senate Bill 996, which amended paragraph 38 of
the Act, unconstitutionally violated the separation of powers
principle. Id. at 464, 617 A.2d at 236.
The court next examined the constitutionality of section 38's
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original provisions, including the discretionary "whenever possible" language. Id. The court concluded that the provision under
section 38 exempting state troopers, corrections officers or service personnel from being laid off was invalid. Id. The supreme
court reasoned that similar to the amendments in Senate Bill
996, this condition impermissibly interfered with executive decision-making authority. Id. Regarding the "whenever possible"
portion of section 38, Justice Garibaldi deemed it necessary first
to determine whether that provision could be severed from the
mandatory language of amended section 38, which the court had
already held unconstitutional. Id. The answer to this inquiry, the
justice explained, was necessary to determine whether the Senate
Bill 996 amendments had the effect of repealing the original discretionary language. Id.
Justice Garibaldi analyzed this issue by reviewing the doctrine of severing an unconstitutional section of a statute. Id. at
465, 617 A.2d at 236. The court immediately recognized that
application of this doctrine should be cautionary and adhere to
legislative intent. Id. Specifically, the court maintained that if the
legislature intended that an unconstitutional amendment would
not render a pre-existing statute inoperative, that amendment
would not impair the previous provision's validity. Id. (citing
Washington Nat' Ilns. Co v. Board of Review, 1 N.J. 545, 556, 64 A.2d
443 (1949)). Although upholding the discretionary language
while invalidating the mandatory provisions would inhibit the
legislative intent to provide recommendations in layoffs, the
court perceived that discretionary guidance was better than no
guidance. Id. Because the amendment to section 38 did not impair the original "whenever possible" language, the court restored the pre-existing discretionary provision to the Act. Id.
Restoring the original section 38, the court reasoned, would provide the executive branch with room to exercise its judgment
when administering layoffs and, unlike the previous section,
would require less interference with the executive authority. Id.
Concluding, the supreme court made clear its reluctance to
interfere in separation of powers controversies. Id. at 467, 617
A.2d at 237. These disputes, the court offered, should instead be
resolved by the appropriate branches. Id. Because the issues in
the present case raised substantial separation of powers concerns
between the legislative and executive branches, however, the
court limited its holding solely to the questions presented in the
complaint and appeal. Id. Accordingly, the court held Section 1
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of Senate Bill 996 and section 38 of the Appropriations Act unconstitutional, but upheld the discretion guidance provisions of
the Act as permissible under the separation of powers doctrine.
Id.
In Communications Workers of America AFL-CIO, the New Jersey
Supreme Court correctly upheld the separation of powers doctrine with regard to the executive's authority to implement
budget appropriations by the legislative branch. Separating powers among the state's three governmental branches facilitates
"cooperative accommodation" rather than absolute division. See
Honorable Marie L. Garibaldi, The New Jersey Experience: Accommodating the Separationbetween the Legislatureand theJudiciary, 23 SETON
HALL L. REV. 3, 5 (1992). By recognizing the "whenever possible" language, the court permitted the legislature to retain some
influence in the budget allocation process. Moreover, the court's
decision sends an underlying message that politically-motivated
power plays will not withstand constitutional review.
The executive branch's ability solely to allocate, and not appropriate, budget appropriations, however, may have an unintended effect. To avoid the consequences of Communications
Workers of America AFL-CIO, the legislature may appropriate funds
according to positions or departments, inevitably forcing the executive branch to comply with legislation dictating specific personnel reductions. As a result, executive authority over
implementation of budget appropriations will become virtually
ineffective as the legislative branch circumvents the limitations of
their authority under the separation of powers doctrine. In a
time of fiscal crisis, neither the state nor the taxpayers can afford
such a predicament.
Kim Schimenti
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EVIDENCE-EXPERT TESTIMONY-EXPERT TESTIMONY ON CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE ACCOMMODATION SYNDROME MUST BE LIMITED TO AN EXPLANATION OF WHY SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILDREN DELAY REPORTING THEIR ABUSE AND CAN NOT BE USED
TO ESTABLISH GUILT OR INNOCENCE OF THE DEFENDANT-State

of New Jersey v.J.Q., 130 N.J. 554,,617 A.2d 1196 (1993).
Fictitious names are employed for the parties involved because this matter concerns child sexual abuse. 130 NJ. at 557,
617 A.2d at 1198. Although they never married, John and Karen
had two children, Connie and Norma, born in 1977 and 1979,
respectively. The couple and their children resided in Newark,
New Jersey. In late 1984, the couple became estranged. Their
breakup, however, did not become final until early 1986. At that
time, Connie and Norma were roughly eight and six years of age,
respectively.
Following the couple's breakup, John routinely took his
daughters for weekend visits to Brooklyn, where he resided in a

one-room apartment with his new wife. Id. at 558, 617 A.2d at
1198. Approximately two years after the separation, Karen noticed strange playtime behavior in Norma, leading Karen to believe that her children may have been victims of sexual abuse.
Eventually, both girls reported to the police that they had been
repeatedly sexually abused by their father. John was later
charged by an Essex County grand jury with acts of sexual abuse
against his children in New Jersey during 1984.
At trial, both children detailed the abuses they had suffered,
consisting of oral sexual contact and sexual penetration. Id. at
558-59, 617 A.2d at 1199. The medical evidence was consistent
with the described sexual abuse. Id. In addition, the jury heard
testimony from Madeline Milchman, the prosecution's expert.
Id. As a Ph.D. in psychology with a concentration in child psychology, Dr. Milchman qualified as an expert on child sexual
abuse. Id. at 558, 617 A.2d at 1199. The doctor identified the
behavioral pattern frequently occurring in young victims of incest as Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome (CSAAS).
Id. at 559, 617 A.2d at 1199. After a description of the facets of
CSAAS, Dr. Milchman analogized these characteristics to behavior she had witnessed in Connie and Norma. Id. Additionally,
the doctor testified concerning the method she employs to determine the veracity of an alleged victim's story. Id. She concluded
that, in her opinion, the two girls had been sexually abused. Id.
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Subsequently, the jury entered a conviction of two counts of
endangering the welfare of a child and multiple counts of firstdegree aggravated sexual assault. Id. The defendant was sentenced to thirty years in prison, with parole eligibility after ten
years. Id. On appeal the convictions were reversed. Id. The
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division found that the
lower court committed plain error when it permitted CSAAS evidence to be used to establish the occurrence of sexual abuse. Id.
at 559-60, 617 A.2d at 1199 (quoting State v.J.Q., 252 N.J. Super.
11, 15, 599 A.2d 172 (1991)). A sole member of the appellate
panel dissented, based on the belief that in a Rule 8 hearing a
valid case could be constructed to substantiate the scientific reliability of CSAAS evidence. Id. at 560, 617 A.2d at 1199. The New
Jersey Supreme Court granted the parties' requests for certification, and subsequently affirmed the appellate court's decision.
Id. at 560, 584, 617 A.2d at 1200, 1212.
Based on scientific recognition of CSAAS, the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted that, to assist jurors in their evaluation of
the case, an expert witness may describe characteristics common
to victims of child sexual abuse. Id. at 582, 617 A.2d at 1211. In
this case, however, the court found that the expert's opinion
transcended the scope of CSAAS and that the presentation of
such testimony could yield an unfair result. Id. Accordingly, the
state supreme court held that the trial court committed plain error in admitting Dr. Milchman's testimony. Id.
Justice O'Hern, writing for a unanimous court, commenced
his analysis by surveying the categories of expert testimony commonly presented in child abuse cases. Id. at 562-66, 617 A.2d at
1201-03. First, the justice articulated, there is customarily accepted testimony that presents no evidentiary problems, including medical testimony and a child's out-of-court statement
regarding the abuse. Id. at 563, 617 A.2d at 1201. Second, the
court continued, the field of behavioral science offers expert testimony on the conduct typical of sexually-abused youths. Id.
Most courts, Justice O'Hern explained, do not sanction behavioral-science testimony. Id. at 564, 617 A.2d at 1201. The court
stated that such testimony, however, could be utilized to rehabilitate a child's testimony when the defense asserts that the delay in
disclosing or the later recanting of abuse allegations demonstrates that the child is lying. Id. Third, the court explained, another realm of behavioral-science testimony addresses whether
or not a child was actually sexually abused. Id. The justice ex-
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plained that this form of testimony is founded on clinical examinations by professionals "trained in patterns, effects, and
dynamics of child sexual abuse." Id. (quotingJohn E.B. Myers et
al., Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 NEB. L. REV.
1 (1989)). This type of testimony, the court concluded, has not
been accepted by a consensus of the scientific community. Id. at
565, 617 A.2d at 1202. A final class of expert testimony, the
court noted, draws inferences from a child's use of anatomicallydetailed dolls and arrives at conclusions as to the existence of
child abuse using this method. Id. at 566, 617 A.2d at 1202. The
court asserted that although this expert testimony was not
presented in the instant case, it could be a helpful aid to jurors.
Id., 617 A.2d at 1203.
The court then concentrated on a particular area of behavioral-science evidence-CSAAS testimony. Id. at 567, 617 A.2d
at 1203. The syndrome, Justice O'Hern explained, consists of
five behavioral categories. Id. at 568, 617 A.2d at 1203. Thejustice observed that the first two categories, secrecy and helplessness, are "preconditions" to the occurrence of abuse. Id. at 56869, 617 A.2d at 1204. The court added that the next three categories are "sequential contingencies" to abuse. Id. at 569, 617
A.2d at 1204. In the third category, the court indicated, the child
feels trapped by the situation, and consequently behaves in ways
that accommodate the abuse. Id. Conflicted, delayed and unconvincing disclosure, the court maintained, is the fourth aspect of
CSAAS. Id. The final characteristic, Justice O'Hern stated, is the
child's later retraction of his or her claims of abuse. Id. at 570,
617 A.2d at 1204.
Moreover, Justice O'Hern acknowledged, CSAAS implies
the existence of abuse and justifies the child's response to such
abuse. Id. at 579, 617 A.2d at 1209. Evidence on CSAAS, the
justice promulgated, should be presented solely to explicate
traits commonly discovered in abused children. Id. The syndrome, the court continued, aids in understanding why many victims of child abuse procrastinate in reporting the incidents, and
why children frequently recant claims of abuse and deny that the
abuse ever occurred. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, evidence on CSAAS should be confined solely to rehabilitative functions. Id.
The court next referred to the general standards for determining the admissibility of expert testimony in the field of child
sex-abuse offenses. Id. at 571-72, 617 A.2d at 1205 (citing State v.
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R.W, 104 N.J. 14, 514 A.2d 1287 (1986)). First, the court explained that the expert, to testify at trial, must possess sufficient
expertise in the field. Id. at 583-84, 617 A.2d at 1211-12. Second, the court declared that the proffered testimony must regard
subject matter that an average juror would not understand. Id. at
572, 617 A.2d at 1205 (quoting R.W, 104 N.J. at 30-31). Third,
the court recognized that the expert must testify about a reliable
scientific field. Id. (quoting R. W, 104 N.J. at 30-3 1). Justice
O'Hern emphasized that the court must be careful in admitting
expert testimony in child sex-abuse cases, because scientific acceptance can be difficult to prove and criminal cases require a
strict standard of scrutiny. Id. at 572-73, 617 A.2d at 1205-06.
The justice reminded the court that juries are responsible for ascertaining guilt or innocence in a criminal trial. Id. at 573, 617
A.2d at 1206. Therefore, the court stated, proper instructions
must be given to the jury to confine the testimony to the intent
for which it was proffered. Id. at 584, 617 A.2d at 1212.
Having set forth the boundaries of CSAAS evidence and the
standards for expert testimony's admissibility, the court focused
on the use of such testimony in the instant case. Id. at 574, 617
A.2d at 1207. Justice O'Hern found that the CSAAS evidence
offered did not conform to its scientific supposition. Id. Dr.
Milchman's testimony, the justice posited, was proffered to the
jury as proof that sexual abuse actually occurred, rather than as
an explanation of the conflicting nature of Connie and Norma's
conduct. Id. The court determined that the prosecution used its
expert to enter areas not encompassed by CSAAS. Id. at 575,
617 A.2d at 1207. Furthermore, the court contended, the state's
expert testified regarding the methods she employed to determine the credibility of the girls' story and her opinion as to
whether the children had been sexually assaulted. Id. at 577-78,
617 A.2d at 1208-09. The court stipulated that no general acceptance, either in legal precedent or scientific literature, has
been established for employing CSAAS testimony to circumstantiate guilt or innocence. Id. at 578, 617 A.2d at 1209. CSAAS,
the court maintained, would have assisted the jury by dispelling
the myth that had abuse actually occurred, Connie and Norma
would have come forward sooner and would not have continued
to visit their father in New York. Id. at 582, 617 A.2d at 1211.
When Dr. Milchman presented her opinion on fundamental factual issues, such as witness credibility, Justice O'Hern opined,
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she transgressed the intention for which syndrome testimony is
admissible. Id.
The court noted that the defense failed to object to Dr.
Milchman's testimony. Id. at 576, 617 A.2d at 1208. If there is to
be objection to expert testimony before a sexual abuse trial, the
court instructed, the trial court is afforded the opportunity to
conduct a Rule 8 hearing. Id. at 583, 617 A.2d at 1211. A Rule 8
hearing's function, the court emphasized, is to ascertain the expert witness's qualifications and to determine whether such opinion testimony could reliably sustain the assertions that the
children were truthful or were sexual-abuse victims. Id. In the
future, the court premonished, defense counsel's failure to object
to admission of such testimony would not result in a new trial.
Id. at 584, 617 A.2d at 1212.
The court found that the sole scientific basis the witness possessed was CSAAS and that trained professionals in the area of
mental health do not view this syndrome as a reliable indicator
that sexual abuse actually occurred. Id. at 583, 617 A.2d at 1211.
The court remarked, however, that a qualified expert may incorporate CSAAS research into his or her overall methodology. Id.
Justice O'Hern stressed that the court's decision was not intended to complicate child sexual abuse cases, but rather to mandate careful adherence to precedent. Id. Prior decisions in child
sexual abuse cases, the court noted, have emphasized considerations that must be taken into account in this sensitive area. Id.
(citations omitted). The court delineated these factors as the necessity or expertise of an expert witness, the general acceptance
of a scientific theory used by an expert, and the use of proper
jury instructions to limit the scope of the expert's testimony. Id.
Therefore, the court held, Dr. Milchman's testimony regarding
the truthfulness of the children was inadmissible. Id. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a new trial. Id. at 584, 617
A.2d at 1212.
TheJ.Q. court properly limited CSAAS testimony to an explanation of why abused children often delay in reporting the
abuse. Because the study of behavioral science is rapidly evolving, expert testimony often plays a vital role in the establishment
of a litigant's case. For example, Battered Woman's Syndrome
and CSAAS are utilized to assist the jury in comprehending why
victims do not act as the average juror feels he or she would act
in a similar situation. For such testimony to be deemed admissible, however, it must be based on reliable, generally accepted sci-
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entific principles. Although the defense can impeach the
credibility and attack the reasoning of the psychologist, the sheer
impact of experts testifying could sway the jury in favor of the
prosecution. Thus, the testimony of a psychologist on the truthfulness of a victim's story could significantly damage a defendant's case. Therefore, trial courts must review carefully the
qualifications of a witness and the reliability of the scientific doctrine to prevent the trier of fact from being mislead.
Corrine A. LaCroix

COMMERCIAL

LAW-DEBTOR-CREDITOR-CREDITOR,

DEBTOR

AND THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY'S EXPECTATIONS AND INTEN-

TIONS ARE RELEVANT IN DETERMINING WHETHER A TRANSFER
OF A DEBTOR'S COLLATERAL SECURITY OBLIGATION IS JUSTIFIED AS A MATTER OF LAW-Delaware Truck Sales, Inc. v. Edward

L. Wilson, 131 N.J. 20, 618 A.2d 303 (1993).
The Royal Bank of Pennsylvania (Royal Bank) loaned Delaware Repair Service, Inc. (Delaware Repair) $75,000 secured by a
financing statement that covered all of Delaware Repair's assets,
including inventory and accounts receivable. 131 NJ. at 22-23,
618 A.2d at 304-05. Royal Bank filed the financing statement
with the Camden County Clerk and the Secretary of State on
September 19, 1984 and September 25, 1984, respectively. Id. at
23, 618 A.2d at 305. In addition, Edward Wilson, the principal of
Delaware Repair, and his wife, Joan Wilson, personally guaranteed the loan and gave Royal Bank a mortgage on their residence
as collateral.
Delaware Truck Service, Inc. (Delaware Truck) sold its business to Delaware Repair for $300,000. Delaware Repair paid
$30,000 cash and gave Delaware Truck a promissory note for the
balance. To secure the loan, Delaware Repair executed two financing statements in favor of Delaware Truck. The first statement covered Delaware Repair's assets and inventory, and
Delaware Truck filed it with the Secretary of State on August 29,
1984 and with the Camden County clerk on September 13, 1984.
The second financing statement, covering Delaware Repair's accounts receivable, was filed on October 4, 1984. Id. at 23-24, 618
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A.2d at 305. The contract for sale between Delaware Repair and
Delaware Truck stated that the security interest in the accounts
receivable was only a secondary lien subject to a prior lien in
favor of Delaware Repair's institutional lender, Royal Bank. Id.
at 23, 618 A.2d at 305.
Delaware Repair subsequently defaulted on both loans. Id.
at 24, 618 A.2d at 305. On May 27, 1988, Delaware Repair executed a "surrender agreement" with Delaware Truck entitling
the latter to collect all assets in which it held a security interest.
Subsequently, Delaware Truck collected $98,600 from Delaware
Repair's accounts receivable and applied it to the remaining
$166,935.58 debt.
In December 1988, Royal Bank obtained a default judgment
against Delaware Repair and the Wilsons, as guarantors for
$62,000. Subsequently, Royal Bank sought to obtain the accounts receivable proceeds from Delaware Truck. On April
1989, without Delaware Repair's knowledge or consent, Royal
Bank and Delaware Truck executed a settlement agreement in
which Delaware Truck paid $59,500 to Royal Bank in exchange
for Royal's default judgment, its security interests in Delaware
Repair's assets, and the Wilson's personal guaranty secured by
the mortgage on their home. Furthermore, the two creditors
signed a subordination agreement denoting Royal Bank as a junior creditor.
Acting on this collusive agreement, Delaware Truck instituted suit to collect on its promissory note and Royal's judgment,
including the personal guarantees. Id. at 25, 618 A.2d at 305-06.
Subsequently, Edward Wilson filed for personal bankruptcy and
a bankruptcy court granted Delaware Truck's motion to modify
the automatic stay to allow Delaware Truck to foreclose on the
Wilson's residence. Id., 618 A.2d at 306. InJuly, 1989, Delaware
Truck, as assignee of Royal Bank, instituted an action to foreclose on the Wilson's home to collect the remaining outstanding
debt of Delaware Repair.
The trial court ruled on Delaware Truck's motion for summary judgment and granted foreclosure. Id. The court determined that Delaware Truck had a first priority lien on Delaware
Repair's accounts receivable because Delaware Truck had filed
the appropriate financing statement first. Id. Moreover, the trial
court reasoned, even though Delaware Truck had transferred
$59,500 of Delaware Repair's accounts receivable to Royal Bank,
the underlying mortgage security was not extinguished. Id. The
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trial court further posited that even if Royal Bank had filed its
financing statement prior to Delaware Truck's filing, Delaware
Truck obtained a senior security interest in the accounts receivable by virtue of the assignment and subordination agreement. Id.
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, reversed, determining that foreclosure by Delaware Truck
was inappropriate. Id. The appellate court concluded that Royal
Bank had filed the financing statement first and therefore had a
first priority lien over the accounts receivable. Id. Therefore, the
court deduced, Delaware Truck held the accounts receivable proceeds in trust for the benefit of Royal Bank. Id. at 29, 618 A.2d at
308. Moreover, the appellate court noted, the subsequent payment of this money to Royal Bank should have satisfied Delaware
Repair's debt and extinguished the underlying personal guaranty. Id. at 26, 618 A.2d at 306.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification, reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Id. at 34, 618 A.2d at 310.
The supreme court held that the record, supported solely by evidence for summary judgment, was insufficient as a matter of law
to sustain a judgment for Delaware Truck, according to the trial
court, or for Delaware Repair and the guarantors, as found by the
appellate court. Id.
Writing for the majority, Justice Handler initially settled the
lower courts' dispute over which creditor held the first priority
interest in Delaware Repair's accounts receivable. Id. at 26, 618
A.2d at 306. According to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-312(5)(a), the
justice declared, when two creditors hold security in the same
collateral and special priority rules fail to control, priority is determined by the time of filing or perfecting a security interest. Id.
at 26-27, 618 A.2d at 306 (citing NJ. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9312(5)(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991)). Therefore, the supreme
court accepted the appellate court's reasoning and concluded
that Royal Bank held a superior lien over the accounts receivable
because of two relevant factors. Id. at 27, 618 A.2d at 306-07.
First, the court emphasized that the sales agreement between
Delaware Repair and Delaware Truck specified that the accounts
receivable was subject to a prior lien held by Royal Bank. Id., 618
A.2d at 307. Second, the court noted that although Delaware
Truck had filed a financing statement covering many of Delaware
Repair's assets prior to Royal Bank's filing, it was Delaware
Truck's second financing statement that specifically covered the
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accounts receivable. Id. By such time, the court observed,
Royal's priority lien position over the accounts receivable had already been perfected. Id. at 28, 618 A.2d at 307.
Moreover, the court barred Delaware Truck's claim that it
had first priority over the inventory generated accounts receivable. Id. Justice Handler recognized that Delaware Truck was the
first creditor to file a financial statement covering the inventory.
Id. at 27, 618 A.2d at 307. The court acknowledged that when
Delaware Repair sold the inventory, creating an open accounts
receivable, Delaware Truck arguably had a perfected security interest in those funds. Id. at 31, 618 A.2d at 309 (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12A:9-306(3) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); 2 JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 345

(3d ed. 1988)). Nevertheless, Justice Handler stated that the
court was satisfied with the appellate court's conclusion that
Royal Bank had a superior security interest in all of the accounts
receivable. Id. at 28, 618 A.2d at 307.
Having determined that Royal Bank held the priority interest
over Delaware Repair's accounts receivable, Justice Handler focused on the settlement agreement between Royal Bank and Delaware Truck. Id. The justice deemed the scant evidence
surrounding this transaction to the source of the present conflict.
Id. at 30-31, 618 A.2d at 308. Justice Handler posited that the
outcome of the dispute would depend on whether the two creditors attempted to satisfy Royal's outstanding debt, thereby discharging the underlying security obligations of the guarantors, or
whether the agreement intended to transfer Royal Bank's security interests, thereby giving to Delaware Truck all remedies held
previously by Royal. Id. at 28-29, 618 A.2d at 307-08. The court
stated that the parties' intentions controlled this determination.
Id. at 29, 618 A.2d at 308 (citing 10 C.J.S. Bills and Notes 451; Mt.
Holly State Bank v, Washington Hotel, 220 N.J. Super 506, 510 (App.

Div. 1987)). Giving life to the parties' expressed intentions, the
court continued, should also control the agreements among junior and senior creditors. Id. at 30, 618 A.2d at 308 (citing Ottenheimer Publishers v. Regal Publishers, 626 S.W.2d 276 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 1981)). Hence, the court inferred that the parties did not
intend to extinguish Royal Bank's underlying debt, but instead to
mutually transfer the Wilsons' mortgage obligation. Id.
Although the court recognized the parties' intentions, Justice Handler acknowledged that the appellate court may have
been correct in finding that Royal's loan was discharged as a mat-
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ter of law. Id. The justice explained that Royal's first priority
interest over the accounts receivable survived even though Delaware Truck collected the proceeds. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 12A:9-306(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991)). Therefore, the court
continued, Royal Bank reserved an untainted right to those funds
in an amount equal to its security interest. Id. (citing New Hampshire Business Dev. Corp. v. F. R. Lepage Bakery Inc., 832 F.2d 7 (1st
Cir. 1987)). Justice Handler opined that Delaware Truck could
have been acting as a constructive trustee on behalf of Royal. Id.
Justice Handler refused to rule on the apparent intentions of
the creditors and the appellate court's determination. Id. at 3031, 618 A.2d at 308. Thejustice characterized the record as void
of evidence explaining the circumstances of Royal Bank's claim
against Delaware Truck and the eventual settlement of that claim.
Id. The court added that the record failed to illustrate sufficiently
Royal Bank's knowledge and expectations concerning whether
Delaware Repair would surrender the accounts receivable to Delaware Truck, and whether the money would reduce Delaware
Truck's loan. Id. at 31 618 A.2d at 308. Furthermore, the court
acknowledged the dearth of evidence respecting Delaware
Truck's cognizance and anticipation of collecting the accounts receivable and ignoring Royal Bank's first priority lien. Id. Moreover, the court continued, the record failed to inform the court
whether Delaware Truck had any justifiable claim of right to the
accounts receivable or whether it held valid defenses against
Royal Bank's claim to those proceeds. Id., 618 A.2d at 308-09.
In addition to the lack of evidence regarding Royal Bank's
and Delaware Truck's knowledge and expectations, the court further posited that Delaware Repair and its guarantors' intentions
and expectations for surrendering their assets to Delaware Truck
also could be pertinent. Id., 618 A.2d at 309. Specifically, the
court noted that the record did not indicate whether Delaware
Repair believed that the debt to Royal Bank was extinguished
with the payment of accounts receivable to Delaware Truck. Id.
at 32, 618 A.2d at 309. The court further opined that Delaware
Repair's failure to raise this defense at trial or to implead Delaware Truck as a constructive trustee were relevant to determining whether Delaware Repair believed that Delaware Truck's
outstanding loan could be reduced without first eliminating the
Wilsons' mortgage as collateral. Id.
Justice Handler articulated that the Wilsons' personal guaranty had far greater implications than the Wilsons may have an-
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ticipated. Id. For example, the court explained, the guaranty
gave Royal Bank full discretion over the mortgage, including the
inherent right to assign it to Delaware Truck. Id. (citing Lenape
State Bank v. Winslow Corp., 216 N.J. Super. 115, 127-28 (App. Div.
1985)). The justice clarified that Royal Bank could forego the
other security interests and foreclose on the home to satisfy the
outstanding debt. Id. at 32-33, 618 A.2d at 309 (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 12A:9-501(4) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); Lenape, 216 N.J.
Super. at 130). Furthermore, Justice Handler suggested that the
doctrine of marshalling assets might have obligated Royal Bank
to foreclose on the mortgage to allow Delaware Truck to recover
its debt from the other security interests. Id. at 33, 618 A.2d at
309-10 (citing Meyer v. United States, 375 U.S. 233 (1963)). The
justice claimed that the record not only lacked information regarding whether the Wilsons were aware of Royal Bank's uncontrolled discretion over their personal guaranty, but it also failed
to indicate whether Royal would have selected one remedy over
another or whether the Delaware Truck settlement was an intentional selection of a remedy provided by the guarantee. Id., 618
A.2d at 310.
Having articulated the record's numerous deficiencies, Justice Handler carefully delineated the various portions of the record that needed further development in the trial court. Id. at 34,
618 A.2d at 310. First, the court queried whether Delaware
Truck was unjustly enriched by collecting from the accounts receivable and then taking an assignment of the Wilson's mortgage. Id. Second, the court deemed it necessary to ascertain
whether Royal Bank was paid an amount equivalent to its default
judgment against Delaware Repair. Id. Finally, the court queried
whether Royal and Delaware Truck entered into a valid settlement agreement. Id.
The majority concluded the court's opinion by discharging
Delaware Repair's claim that its personal guaranties were extinguished through the liquidation of collateral. Id. at 33-34, 618
A.2d at 310. The court stated that any impairment of collateral
defense had to be waived unequivocally in the guaranty agreement before a guarantor will be precluded from asserting it. Id.
at 34, 618 A.2d at 310 (citing Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corporation, 74
N.J. 45 (1977)).
Seeking an equitable resolution, Justice Pollack wrote separately to provide further guidance to the trial court on the parties' relative rights and duties. Id. at 34-35, 618 A.2d at 310
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(Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock agreed with the majority
and the appellate court that Royal Bank held a priority lien on
non-inventory-generated accounts receivable. Id. at 36, 618 A.2d
at 311 (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice further opined that
Royal Bank's superior interest in the accounts receivable governed the rights and obligations of Delaware Repair, the Wilsons
and Delaware Truck, as well as controlling the outcome of the
dispute. Id. Justice Pollock disagreed with the majority's finding
that the inventory-generated accounts receivable were the property of Delaware Truck. Id. Nevertheless, the justice dismissed
this disagreement because the greater amount of the money
transferred to Royal Bank were non-inventory proceeds. Id.
The justice explained that had Delaware Truck recognized
Royal Bank as the senior creditor, Royal Bank would have collected Delaware Repair's accounts receivable, thereby satisfying
the loan, and canceling the Wilsons' mortgage guaranty. Id. at
37, 618 A.2d at 311 (Pollock, J., concurring). Instead, Justice
Pollock criticized, Delaware Truck unjustly enriched itself at the
expense of the Wilsons by applying the accounts receivable proceeds to the outstanding debt when the money rightfully belonged to Royal Bank. Id. at 38, 618 A.2d at 312 (Pollock, J.,
concurring). Furthermore, this misappropriation, the concurrence continued, forced Royal Bank to assign the Wilsons' mortgage to Delaware Truck in exchange for money Delaware Truck
held as a constructive trustee. Id. at 45, 618 A.2d at 315 (Pollock,
J., concurring). Justice Pollock explained, however, that Delaware Truck obtained the mortgage through misuse of the proceeds in violation of its duty under the Uniform Commercial
Code. Id. at 39-40, 618 A.2d at 313 (Pollock, J., concurring).
Next, Justice Pollock focused on the settlement agreement
between the two creditors. Id. at 40, 618 A.2d at 313 (Pollock, J.,
concurring). The justice was unpersuaded that the record compelled the majority's inference of the creditors' intentions to extinguish the Wilsons' personal guaranty. Id. Moreover, whereas
the majority conceded that the Wilsons' debt may have been extinguished as a matter of law, the concurrence aligned with the
appellate court and determined that the debt was extinguished as
a matter of law. Id. Justice Pollock explained that both the Wilsons and Royal Bank had an expectation that the accounts receivable would be paid to the senior interest holder to satisfy the
debt and cancel the underlying mortgage. Id. at 41, 618 A.2d at
313 (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice further explained that
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although the guaranty was absolute and fully assignable, the Wilsons' expectations in executing a personal guaranty for Royal
Bank could not be defeated by an agreement between the creditors without the Wilsons' consent. Id., 618 A.2d at 313-14 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing Ottenheimer Publishersv. Regal Publishers,
626 S.W.2d 276, 280 (Tenn. App. 1981)). Thejustice explained
that the guaranty is dependent on whether the Wilsons expected
Delaware Truck to pay Royal Bank its interest in the accounts
receivable proceeds. Id. Thejustice asserted that it is not, as the
majority claimed, because Royal Bank may have an obligation to
Delaware Truck to satisfy their debt from the mortgage first. Id.
Justice Pollock emphasized that the majority's construct would
lead to a "circuity of action" involving suit by the Wilsons against
Royal Bank for its failure in applying the security proceeds to the
loan, and a suit by Royal Bank against Delaware Truck for misappropriation. Id. at 41-42, 618 A.2d at 314 (Pollock, J.,
concurring).
The concurring justice criticized the majority for rejecting
the Wilsons' claim that their personal guarantee was extinguished with the liquidation of the collateral. Id. at 43, 618 A.2d
at 314 (Pollock,J., concurring). Additionally, the justice recalled,
the New Jersey Supreme Court has previously held that "[t]he
rule forbidding impairment of collateral has as its chief aim the
protection of [the] potential benefits made available through subrogation." Id. (citing Langeveld v. L.R.Z.H. Corp., 74 N.J. 45, 51
(1977)). Therefore, if Royal Bank foreclosed on the Wilsons'
home, the justice reasoned, the parties would be in their present
positions and the Wilsons would have a claim against Delaware
Truck for misappropriation. Id. at 42, 618 A.2d at 314 (Pollock,
J., concurring).
Accordingly, Justice Pollock concluded, the court's focus
should not have been on the creditors, but rather on the legal
relationship between the Wilsons and Delaware Truck. Id. at 43,
618 A.2d at 314 (Pollock, J., concurring). Justice Pollock criticized the majority for relying on the possibility that Royal Bank
could marshall its assets to benefit Delaware Truck. Id.
Justice Pollock surveyed general law on creditors' rights and
obligations in the event of the disposition of collateral, and concluded the concurrence by analogizing the case at bar to a First
Circuit case. Id. at 43-44, 618 A.2d at 314-15 (Pollock, J., concurring). The justice referenced New Hampshire Business Development Corp. v. F.R. Lepage Bakery, wherein a junior creditor
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collected the proceeds of an accounts receivable and the court
imposed a constructive trust on the junior creditor in favor of the
senior creditor. Id. at 44, 618 A.2d at 315 (Pollock, J., concurring) (citing New Hampshire Bus. Dev. Corp. v. F.R. Lepage, 832 F.2d

7 (1st Cir. 1987)).
The justice stated that although the case at bar concerned a
debtor, the debtor's guarantors and a misappropriating junior
creditor, a constructive trust is an appropriate remedial device.
Id. at 45, 618 A.2d at 315. The justice emphasized that Royal
Bank could exercise its right to an equitable lien insofar as Delaware Truck had unjustly enriched itself and held the proceeds in
constructive trust for the Wilsons' benefit. Id., 618 A.2d at 31516 (citing 5
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§ 291.4, at 82; § 508.2, at 569; § 462.2, at 313-14).
The Uniform Commercial Code recognizes the importance
of carrying out the parties' intentions by dispensing with formalities. The Wilsons secured Delaware Truck's loan with assets of
their business and intentionally did not personally guaranty the
loan with a mortgage on their home. Because the Wilsons did
not originally agree to confer this benefit on Delaware Truck, it
appears inequitable to allow Delaware Truck to foreclose on the
Wilsons' home to satisfy their outstanding loan to Delaware Repair. Moreover, Delaware Truck's subsequent assignment of
foreclosure from Royal Bank was conducted without the Wilsons'
knowledge or consent. The Wilsons right to be informed of the
potential loss of their property is fundamental, and their beliefs
and expectations of a creditor's control over their loans and collateral is paramount. The New Jersey Supreme Court's hesitancy
to find for either party was justifiable considering the paucity of
evidence regarding the parties' expectations and the potential
loss of the Wilsons' home.
OF TRUSTS,

Lon G. Rhodes
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PUBLIC OFFICIALS-PENSIONS-A LONG-TIME PUBLIC SERVANT MAY BE DENIED ALL PENSION RIGHTS FOR MISCONDUCT
COMMITrTED TOWARD THE END OF HIS CAREER-Corvelli v.

Board of Trustees, Police and Firemen's Retirement System, 130 N.J.
539, 617 A.2d 1189 (1992).
George Corvelli joined the police department of the Borough of Ridgefield in September, 1955. 130 N.J. at 541, 617
A.2d at 1190. He was promoted from patrolman to sergeant in
1969, and became Chief of Police in 1978. Late in 1982, Corvelli
became displeased with a police officer named Bogovich, apparently because Bogovich testified against a fellow police officer,
and therefore assigned Bogovich to foot patrol in a park from
2:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. Id. at 542, 617 A.2d at 1190. This burdensome and atypical assignment continued for well over two
years. In addition, Corvelli also executed a plot with another officer to steal a shotgun from Bogovich's patrol car when
Bogovich was on a coffee break. Id. at 543. Corvelli then suspended Bogovich for five days for carelessness in allowing the
gun to be stolen.
In April, 1985, a grand jury indicted Corvelli for misconduct
and third-degree theft of a weapon, and Corvelli was convicted a
year later. Id. at 541-42, 617 A.2d at 1190. After his conviction,
Corvelli surrendered his office as required by NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:51-2. Id. at 542, 617 A.2d at 1190. In the same month of
his conviction, Corvelli applied to the Police and Firemen's Retirement System for special retirement as authorized by N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 43:16A-11.1. Corvelli instituted an administrative
appeal after his application was denied. Id. The Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) recommended that Corvelli forfeit only the portion of his pension that represented the time during which he was
guilty of misconduct. Id. In making his recommendation, the
ALJ relied on the test that the New Jersey Supreme Court formulated in Uricoli v. Board of Trustees, which set forth eleven factors
that should be weighed in deciding whether the forfeiture of a
pension for dishonorable service is appropriate, including the seriousness of any offense by the employee and whether it was continuing or isolated, the relationship between the misconduct and
the employee's public responsibilities, and the quality of moral
turpitude. Id. at 543-44, 617 A.2d at 1191 (quoting Uricoli v.
Board of Trustees, 91 N.J. 62, 449 A.2d 1267 (1982)). After applying the Uricoli test to his findings of fact, the ALJ determined that
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despite Corvelli's misconduct, his length of honorable public service overshadowed his misbehavior and, consequently, recommended that Corvelli be given a pension that would reflect his
pre-crime service. Id. at 544, 617 A.2d at 1191.
The Board of Trustees of the Police and Firemen's Retirement System (Board) rejected this recommendation, reasoning
that the continuing misconduct toward Bogovich and the abuse
of his office associated with the gun stealing incident warranted
total forfeiture. Id. at 545, 617 A.2d at 1192. The New Jersey
Superior Court, Appellate Division, emphasizing the continuous
nature of Corvelli's misconduct, affirmed the Board's decision.
Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and affirmed after concluding that the Board's decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and was supported by the evidence. Id. at
541, 617 A.2d at 1189.
Justice Clifford, writing for a unanimous court, commenced
his analysis by agreeing that Corvelli's conduct constituted a continuing offense. Id. at 546, 617 A.2d at 1192-93. Justice Clifford
considered each day that Bogovich was forced to patrol the park
as an independent decision by Corvelli to punish him. Id., 617
A.2d at 1193. The justice reasoned that when broken down into
its components, Corvelli's conduct entailed 650 individual decisions constituting an abuse of power. Id. at 546, 547, 617 A.2d at
1192-93. The stealing of the shotgun, explained Justice Clifford,
was only the final act in series of multiple offenses. Id. at 547,
617 A.2d at 1193. As additional support, Justice Clifford looked
to two New Jersey cases, Eyers v. Board of Trustees, 91 N.J. 51, 449
A.2d 1261 (1982) and Widdis v. Public Employees' Retirement System,

238 NJ. Super. 70, 568 A.2d 1227 (App. Div. 1990), wherein
pensioners were denied full pension benefits after committing
numerous crimes. Id.
In Eyers, Justice Clifford recalled, the state supreme court
overturned the appellate division's judgment that the widow of a
plumbing inspector convicted of three counts of accepting
money in return for hiding plumbing violations, should forfeit
the entire pension derived from her husband's employment. Id.
In Widdis, the justice observed, the appellate division upheld the
allowance of partial pension benefits notwithstanding the public
employee's indictment on numerous criminal charges. Id. Compared to Widdis and Eyers, Justice Clifford concluded, Corvelli's
conduct constituted "at least as much a continuing offense." Id.
The court next turned to Corvelli's contention that total for-
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feiture of his pension was arbitrary and capricious because
neither the appellate division nor the supreme court had upheld
a total forfeiture within the past ten years. Id. at 548, 617 A.2d at
1193. Justice Clifford pointed out that the previous cases were
distinguishable on the facts. Id. (citing T.J.M. v. Police and Fireman's Retirement System, 218 N.J. Super 274, 527 A.2d 883 (App.
Div. 1987), and Eyers v. Board of Trustees, 91 NJ. 51, 449 A.2d
1261 (1982)). The justice noted that in T.J.M. v. Police and Fireman's Retirement System, for example, the police officer's criminal
convictions were unconnected to his public employment. Id.,
617 A.2d at 1194. Unlike T.J.M., Corvelli's behavior was directly
related to his employment, stated the court. Id. Justice Clifford
then distinguished Eyers, noting that a major difference between
Eyers and the case at bar were the circumstances of the affected
dependents. Id. at 549, 617 A.2d at 1194. The supreme court
remarked that the court considered very seriously Eyers's
widow's advanced age, her total reliance on Eyers during their
marriage and her reliance on the pension benefits. Justice Clifford surmised that Eyers stood for the proposition that the entire
circumstances of the employee's beneficiaries are factors to consider in the forfeiture decision. Id. Justice Clifford declared that
in the present case the circumstances of Corvelli's beneficiaries
did not compel a grant of benefits to them. Id.
The court then turned its attention to Corvelli's argument
that forfeiture was precluded because the statute providing for
special retirement, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16A-11.1, does not contain an express forfeiture provision. Id. The court rejected
Corvelli's reliance on Widdis as demonstrative of that point after
pointing out-that the appellate division ultimately upheld partial
forfeiture of the pension benefits in that case. Id. at 550, 617
A.2d at 1194-95.
Justice Clifford conceded, however, that the special retirement statute does not contain specific forfeiture language. Id.,
617 A.2d at 1195. Thejustice commented that the inquiry, however, does not end there. Id. The justice explained that dishonorable service has been grounds for pension forfeiture under the
common law for more than fifty years. Id. The justice reasoned
that a requirement of honorable service is an implicit condition
precedent in all New Jersey public pension statutes. Id. Additionally, according to the justice, the legislature must have
sought to include honorable service as an ingredient of "credita-
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ble service," which is statutorily required for eligibility for special retirement. Id.
Justice Clifford amplified his argument that the legislature
authorized pension forfeiture by referencing NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 43:16A-23, which provides that a person who has rendered
twenty-five years of honorable service to a police or fire department shall not be denied pension privileges for the violation of
departmental rules, but that a person found guilty by a court may
be punished in "any manner as provided by law." Id. at 551, 617
A.2d at 1195. The justice reasoned that, because Corvelli was
found guilty in court, and because the statute allowed any punishment provided by law, Corvelli's pension was forfeitable. Id.
The court then considered Corvelli's contention that under
Uricoli his non-criminal behavior should not be considered in de-

nying a pension. Id. The court reiterated that the criminal theft
of the shotgun was only the consummation of a pattern of behavior, and that the harassment of Bogovich was a part of that pattern. Id. The court emphasized that the Board justifiably based
its decision on "the whole sorry picture." Id. The court also
stressed that the balancing test developed in Uricoli was intended
to be flexible to accommodate equitable considerations. Id. The
court considered it especially significant that the Uricoli test specifically mentioned "misconduct" twice, and reasoned that the
general tenor of the Uricoli test allowed non-criminal conduct as a
factor to consider in determining whether a forfeiture of a pension is justified. Id. at 552, 617 A.2d at 1196. The court concluded that the total forfeiture of Corvelli's pension was
consistent with Uricoli, and was warranted by the evidence. Id.
While the court found this to be a clear-cut case calling for
the total forfeiture of the pension, it lamented the lack of clear
standards available to the various pension boards when considering the matter of forfeiture. Id. at 553, 617 A.2d at 1196. The
court warned that in less obvious cases there may be a danger of
ad hoc decision making, leading to inconsistent results. Id. The
court therefore urged the affected boards to promulgate clear
standards to guide their determinations. Id. Such standards
would increase public confidence and aid appellate review to develop a consistent and harmonious body of law. Id. The court
did not envision a requirement of extensive criteria contemplating every eventuality, but posited that something analogous to
the ABA Model Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions would
be suitable. Id. The court expected that the individual boards
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would each establish its separate standards, and would base their
decisions on these standards. Id.
In Corvelli, the state supreme court, for the first time in more
than ten years, approved the total forfeiture of a public servant's
pension. If a pension is viewed as deferred compensation, it is
clear that a person who serves dishonorably is not entitled to accrue pension rights during the period of his misconduct, simply
because he has not earned those rights. Such is not the case,
however, for a long-term employee who has given many faithful
years to his employer. During the period of dedicated effort, the
employee has earned his pension accumulation. The legislature
seemed to recognize that right. The Corvelli court did not.
Peter McKenna

EVIDENCE-HLA

TESTS

IN

CRIMINAL

PATERNITY

CASES-A

PROBABILITY OF PATERNITY OPINION, BASED ON BAYES' THEO-

REM AND INTRODUCED BY MEANS OF AN INCLUSIONARY PERCENTAGE, DOES NOT AID THE JURY IN ITS DELIBERATIONS AND
GENERALLY IS NOT ACCEPTED IN CRIMINAL CASES-State v.

Spann, 130 N.J. 484, 617 A.2d 247 (1993).
Defendant Joseph Spann, a security officer at Salem County
Jail, was charged and convicted of second degree sexual assault.
130 NJ. at 488, 617 A.2d at 248. The defendant violated N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2c(3), which criminalizes sexual intercourse
between a corrections officer and a detainee or convicted inmate,
regardless of coercion or consent. The State's evidence consisted of blood and tissue samples, including human leukocyte
antigen (HLA) tests, introduced to prove that the defendant had
intercourse with the detainee and fathered her child while she
was incarcerated. This evidence was introduced by means of a
probability of paternity opinion. Id. at 488-89, 617 A.2d at 249.
The State's expert testified that the probability of paternity
opinion was based on a fifty-fifty prior probability, which gave
equal weight to the victim's allegations that the defendant was
the father of her child and to the defendant's denial of the allegation. Id. at 493, 617 A.2d at 251. The expert further explained
that additional factors were the 100 percent probability that the

1993]

SURVEY

1233

father of the child would have the requisite blood type, and the 1
percent probability that a man selected casually would have the
requisite blood type. Id. These percentages were then applied to
the Bayes' Theorem, an analytical construct that measures the
probability of parentage. The resulting percentage for defendant
was submitted as an inclusionary figure of 96.55 percent. Id.
The appellate court found that the probability of paternity
percentage was tainted by the fifty-fifty prior probability, which
presumed that sexual intercourse had occurred. Id. at 496, 617
A.2d at 254. Consequently, the appellate division reversed the
conviction and excluded the final probability percentage, because
it was highly prejudicial to the defendant. Id. Thereafter, the
New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to review
whether the evidence had been properly admitted and whether
its admittance constituted plain error. Id. at 488, 617 A.2d at
248-49.
In a per curiam decision, the supreme court affirmed the exclusion of the evidence and remanded the case to the trial court.
Id. at 521, 617 A.2d at 265. Upon reviewing the facts, the court
concluded that it was doubtful that the prior probability would be
less than fifty percent. Id. The court also rejected the appellate
division's conclusion that the fifty-fifty probability presumed sexual intercourse. Id. at 497, 617 A.2d at 253. Instead, the justices
found that the fifty-fifty prior probability was substantially high,
hence its failure to account for the facts in the case, and was unduly prejudicial. Id.
The court noted that the use of HLA test was extended from
merely exonerating defendants to proving paternity in civil cases.
Id. at 489-92, 617 A.2d at 249-52. This evolution, the court explained, occurred as a consequence of the increase in the exclusionary percentage and corresponding decrease in the
inclusionary percentage. Id. at 490-92, 617 A.2d at 250-51. Accordingly, the court reasoned, the New Jersey Legislature
prompted by federal law, amended the parentage laws to
broaden the use of HLA tests in civil paternity cases. Id. at 492,
617 A.2d at 250-51. Typically, the court noted, HLA tests are
used in conjunction with statistical probabilities of parentage in
civil cases. Id. On the other hand, the use of HLA test in the
criminal context was initially limited to establishing a "link in the
chain of evidence." Id. at 490, 617 A.2d at 249. The court
found, however, that the HLA test results, expressed in the 96.55
percent inclusionary figure, combined with statistical data nor-
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mally used in civil cases were introduced in this criminal dispute.
Id. at 492, 617 A.2d at 251.
Moreover, the court posited that the use of Bayes' Theorem
based on the fifty-fifty prior probability is widely accepted in civil
cases. Id. at 494, 617 A.2d at 252-53. Nonetheless, the court reasoned that the expert's assertion that the prior probability is
"neutral" was misleading because it lacked any nexus to the facts.
Id. at 497, 617 A.2d at 253. The court buttressed its position by
explaining that even if the defendant had no access to the victim
within the estimated period for conception, the odds against him
could be as high as fifty percent. Id. Even if the jury concluded
that the prior probability was only twenty-five percent, however,
the court found that the final percentage would not be reduced
by half; it would only decrease to 90.24 percent. Id. at 498-99,
617 A.2d at 254. As a result, the court related that the inability of
jurors to reconcile their own appraisal of guilt, based on nonscientific evidence, with the expert's fifty-fifty prior probability,
constituted a mathematical objection to the use of Bayes' Theorem. Id. at 498, 617 A.2d at 253-54. The court explained that
the reliability of the results yielded when applying Bayes' Theorem to the jurors' own prior probability was also highly questionable. Id. at 498-99, 617 A.2d at 253-54. As a consequence, the
court recommended that methods be specifically designed to
avert the use of the confusing and undisputed fifty-fifty prior
probability. Id. at 500, 617 A.2d at 255.
Instead of assisting the fact finder in its calculations, the
court determined that the expert's testimony misled the jury and
that the appellate court's exclusion of the paternity percentage
was thus warranted. Id. The supreme court recognized, however, that a probability of paternity opinion could be admissible if
the expert disclosed his reliance on the fifty-fifty prior
probability. Id. The court required a full interpretation of the
impact of varying prior probability percentages, ranging from ten
percent to ninety percent, on the final percentage. In so ruling,
the court found that such an explanation would lead to a better
understanding of the formula's significance and usefulness, thus
permitting the jury to reach its own prior probability percentage
based on the factual evidence. Id.
The court noted, in dicta, that the exclusionary percentage
of paternity and the related paternity index, statistical data, are
admissible because their combined use comports with acceptable
procedures. Id. at 502, 617 A.2d at 256. In that regard, the court
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reported that non-statistical evidence is consistently used in conjunction with essential statistical evidence to prove collateral issues. Id. at 503-04, 617 A.2d at 256. The court expressed,
however, that the nonessential 96.55 percent probability of paternity was used as the sole evidence to prove the defendant's
guilt. Id. at 517, 617 A.2d at 256-57. The court reasoned that
compelling the jury to focus on the incriminating test results
prior to the presentation of factual evidence violated the presumption of innocence. Id., 617 A.2d at 263. Undermining the
jurors' intuition and common sense, the court contended, is also
the translation of the jurors' low prior probability into a very
high probability percentage. Id. at 517-18, 617 A.2d at 263.
Nonetheless, the court understood that suitable instructions
could counter significantly those objections to employing the
Bayes' Theorem. Id. at 518, 617 A.2d at 263-64.
The court noted that the use of Bayes' Theorem in civil cases
satisfies the standard articulated in Frye v. United States, 292 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), wherein the court mandated the "general
acceptance in the relevant scientific community," but in the criminal context "is not supported by expert testimony, authoritative
legal or scientific writings, or . . . judicial persuasive opinions."

Id. at 510, 617 A.2d at 260 (citation omitted). Due to the lack of
a consensus in the scientific community regarding Bayes' Theorem, and based on the jurors' own prior probability, the court
refused to discuss the reliability of the final paternity percentage
in criminal disputes. Id. at 505, 617 A.2d at 257.
Positing that Bayes' Theorem is subject to different interpretations by the defense attorney and the prosecutor, the court perceived that the jury's need for expert testimony that properly
evaluates the significance of the exclusionary and inclusionary
percentages is exacerbated. Id. at 507-08, 617 A.2d at 258-59.
Furthermore, the supreme court observed that difficulties also
arise from the juror's inability to translate the mathematical
terms, or verbal predicates, into guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Id. at 513, 617 A.2d at 261.
The supreme court entrusted the trial court with the final
determination on the admissibility of Bayes' Theorem. Id. at
505, 617 A.2d at 257. In so holding, the court suggested that the
trial court undergo a Rule 8 hearing to ascertain the fulfillment
of the prerequisites to the admissibility of the expert opinion,
such as the general acceptance of the paternity percentage. Id. at
508-09, 617 A.2d at 258-59. The court also required that expert
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witnesses be specialized in the areas of genetic laws and mathematics. Id. at 519, 617 A.2d at 264. The supreme court further
recommended that the trial court conduct a two-day Rule 4 hearing to determine whether the prejudicial impact of the paternity
opinion would outweigh its probative worth. Id. at 508, 617 A.2d
at 259. The supreme court instructed that if, after an exhaustive
examination, the trial court concluded using Bayes' Theorem to
be permissible, such a result could eventually become precedent.
Id.
The justices recognized the similar reliability and probative
value of the probability of paternity opinion in civil and criminal
disputes. Id. at 512, 617 A.2d at 261. Nevertheless, the court
cautioned that the danger of a wide margin of error, the liberty
interest at stake and the problems in equating "beyond a reasonable doubt" with a probability percentage, compelled the exclusion of the percentage in criminal disputes. Id. at 512-13, 617
A.2d at 261. In spite of that recognition, the supreme court rejected restrictions on paternity percentage requiring that prior to
the admission of the probability opinion, the jury conclude that
sexual intercourse between the defendant and the victim occurred within the pertinent period. Id. at 513-14, 617 A.2d at
261. The justices also rejected the prohibition of exclusionary
percentages under ninety percent. Id. at 514, 617 A.2d at 261.
The court predicted that continuous advances in scientific standards dealing with DNA fingerprinting technology will expand
the use of HLA tests, and further increase the exclusionary percentages. Id. at 515, 617 A.2d at 262. The court stressed, however, that the lack of regulation of laboratories conducting DNA
tests may undermine the test results' reliability. Id.
Although the admissibility of probability opinions in criminal paternity cases remains unresolved, the State v. Spann decision
is laudable for several reasons. Primarily, the court suggested an
analytical framework to accommodate the rapid advances in DNA
technology with the traditional administration of criminal trials.
In so doing, the court astutely did not foreclose the possibility
that, in future cases, probability opinions could be admissible to
prove paternity in criminal trials. Fortunately, the justices recognized that probability opinions can not yet replace the jury's
function of finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Alma G. Lopez
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES-JURY
INSTRUCTION ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES CANNOT BE
COMPANIED

BY ADMONITION THAT A FINDING

Ac-

OF GUILT ON

THAT CHARGE WILL RESULT IN ACQUITrAL BECAUSE OF THE

EXPIRATION OF THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-

State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 618 A.2d 316 (1993).
The State of New Jersey indicted defendant John Short on
February 3, 1988 for the murder of his wife, Candice. 131 N.J. at
47, 618 A.2d at 318. This indictment came more than six years
after the defendant and his father-in-law discovered Candice's
dead body in her parked car. Id. at 50, 618 A.2d at 318. A police
investigation immediately following the killing found evidence
pointing to the defendant as the culprit, and discredited his alibi
for the night of the crime. There was no explanation for the delay in charging the defendant with the killing, which occurred on
June 22, 1981. Id. at 51, 618 A.2d at 318.
The defendant was tried for the murder of his wife. Id. As
an alternative to his alibi, the defendant pleaded that the evidence supported only a conviction for manslaughter, and requested the court to charge the jury on the lesser included
offense of manslaughter. Id. at 51, 53, 618 A.2d at 318, 319. The
judge found in the evidence and trial testimony a rational basis to
support the manslaughter charge, and granting the defendant's
request, charged the jury on both murder and various forms of
manslaughter. Id. at 51, 618 A.2d at 318. Over defense counsel's strenuous objection, the judge also informed the jury that
because the statute of limitations had run on manslaughter, the
defendant would be acquitted if found guilty of that offense. Id.
The jury subsequently found Short guilty of murder, and the
court sentenced him to a thirty year term of imprisonment with a
fifteen-year period of parole ineligibility. Id.
The defendant appealed the trial court conviction, contending that the trial court's instruction that the defendant would be
acquitted if found guilty of manslaughter nullified the intended
operation of the lesser included charge. Id. at 51-52, 618 A.2d at
318-19. The defendant argued that if the jury agreed that the
defendant was responsible for the killing, it might prefer to convict him of murder to ensure punishment, regardless of whether
the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt all elements
of murder, rather than convict him of a charge for which he
would receive no punishment. Id. at 58, 618 A.2d at 322.
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Characterizing the trial court's decision as "harmless error,
if error at all," the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
affirmed the conviction. Id. at 52, 618 A.2d at 319. The appellate division posited that the defendant's reasoning would have
the court craft jury instructions creating an illusion that a finding
of guilt on the manslaughter charge would result in incarceration, which in fact it would not. Id. The appellate division maintained that the defendant would have had a right to the
manslaughter charge unaccompanied by the warning of acquittal
only if he had first waived the charge's statute of limitations. Id.
The defendant, the appellate panel declared, had to choose between the right to enforce the statute of limitations for the manslaughter charge and* the right to have the jury charged on
manslaughter unaccompanied by the acquittal warning; he could
not avail himself of both rights. Id.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey granted Short's petition
for certification to resolve the conflict between the defendant's
protection from prosecution afforded by the statute of limitations
and the benefit of a jury charge on lesser included offenses unencumbered by judicial warnings as to the effect of finding guilt on
those charges. Id. Reversing the appellate division, the court
held that the defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on the
lesser included offense of manslaughter without reference to the
ramifications of a finding of guilt on that offense because of the
statute of limitations. Id. at 62, 618 A.2d at 324.
Writing for the majority, Justice Handler analyzed the jury
instruction by examining the defendant's independent rights to
both the protection afforded by the statute of limitations and the
benefits accrued by instructions on lesser included offenses, in
light of the respective role of the judge and jury in New Jersey's
criminal justice system. Id. at 52, 618 A.2d at 319. The justice
began by explaining the importance ofjury instructions for lesser
included offenses in criminal prosecutions involving capital murder, non-capital murder and non-homicide cases. Id. at 53, 618
A.2d at 319 (citations omitted). The justice pointed out that a
defendant is entitled to have a jury deliberate on all offenses supported by the evidence, and that a restrictive jury instruction
would preclude this entitlement. Id. Often, the court wrote, the
elements of the lesser crime are a defense to the more serious
crime. Id. at 52, 618 A.2d at 319. Therefore, the justice reasoned, when a judge removes a jury's ability to consider the
lesser charge, it also removes the defendant's ability to show that

1993]

SURVEY

1239

the presence of the elements of the lesser crime may negate the
presence of those of the greater crime. Id.
Justice Handler continued to underscore that juror consideration of lesser included offenses in a criminal prosecution is essential to a fair trial because it allows the jury to apply the
reasonable doubt standard. Id. The majority asserted that a jury
will often convict a defendant of a lesser crime when the evidence
does not support a guilty verdict on the more serious crime. Id.
Accordingly, the majority concluded, instruction on a lesser included offense removes pressure on a jury to convict a defendant
of the more serious crime or not to convict at all. Id. at 54, 618
A.2d at 320 (citations omitted). As a result, the justice opined,
the trial court correctly preserved the defendant's right to have
the jury instructed to consider the lesser included offenses supported by the evidence. Id. at 62, 618 A.2d at 324.
The majority opinion next turned to the defendant's right to
protection by the statute of limitations. Id. at 54, 618 A.2d at
320. In principle, the opinion declared that the court can not
impinge upon a defendant's vested rights created by the statute
of limitations. Id. (citations omitted). The justice emphasized
that the statute of limitations is invaluable in criminal cases as a
safeguard against unjust prosecution. Id. at 55, 618 A.2d at 320.
The justice noted that in New Jersey, the prosecution of an offense is rendered impossible by the existence of a statute of limitations that has expired for the given offense, and that the court
can not unilaterally negate the statute's operation. Id.
The difficulty arises, the majority remarked, in attempting to
discern whether the statute of limitations acts as an equally effective bar to prosecution when applied to lesser included offenses
stemming from a more serious crime. Id. To elucidate legislative
intent when this statute was enacted, the justice referenced the
Commentary of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission on the New Jersey Penal Code. Id. at 55-56, 618 A.2d at 320
(citing THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE, VOL. II: REPORT AND PENAL
CODE (1971)). The commentary, the majority posited, contained
two paradoxical positions concerning this matter. Id. at 56, 618
A.2d at 321. In the first instance, noted Justice Handler, the
commentary sanctioned the loss of the right to statute of limitations protection to receive the benefit of the lesser included offense. Id. (quoting THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE, VOL. 11:
REPORT AND PENAL CODE, at 17). The justice next referenced,
however, a subsequent contradictory statement by the commis-
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sion, affirming the strength of the statute of limitations as a bar to
prosecution of a lesser included offense once the statutory period
has expired. Id. (quoting THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE, VOL. II:
REPORT AND PENAL CODE, at 17).
After evaluating the Commentary's contradictory positions,
the justice concluded that the legislature did not intend to reduce
the strength of the statute of limitations as a bar to the prosecution of lesser included offenses. Id. Justice Handler noted that
the Commentary acknowledged the case of State v. Brown, 22 NJ.
405, 126 A.2d 161 (1956) in its discussion of the issue, but distinguished Brown because that case involved a lesser form of murder, rather than the distinct offense of manslaughter at issue in
the case at bar. Id. at 57, 618 A.2d at 321 (citing NEW JERSEY
PENAL CODE, VOL. II: REPORT AND PENAL CODE, at 17). Justice
Handler concluded this part of the analysis by declaring that the
trial court correctly preserved the right to the statute of limitations defense. Id.
Justice Handler next examined the nexus of the defendant's
two independent rights. Id. Recounting the defendant's legal
theory, the justice explained the contention that the trial court
judge's instructions to the jury, encompassing the lesser included
charges of manslaughter, as well as the effects of the statute of
limitations' expiration, nullified the effect of the manslaughter
charge. Id. at 57-58, 618 A.2d at 321. The justice delved into the
defendant's logic, writing that while a lesser included offense is

supposed to allow a jury to determine exactly which crime a defendant committed, free from pressure to convict on a more serious crime or not to convict at all, in this case the result was the
opposite. Id. at 58, 618 A.2d at 321-22. Clarifying the defendant's contention, the justice maintained that the jury was placed
in exactly the same position as if it had never received the instruction for manslaughter. Id., 618 A.2d at 322. The majority
concurred with the defendant's reasoning and conclusion. Id.
By informing the jury that the defendant would remain unpunished if convicted of manslaughter, the justice wrote, the trial
court abridged the very freedom that a lesser offense instruction
should afford ajury. Id. In effect,Justice Handler continued, the
jury instructions deprived the defendant of the reasonable doubt
standard, a full hearing on all defenses and a fair trial. Id. Justice

Handler then articulated that the correct jury charge would have
included the manslaughter offenses without reference to the ef-
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fects of the statute of limitations on a finding of guilt for those
offenses. Id.
Justice Handler noted that a jury instruction formulated
without reference to the statute of limitations, while in accord
with the tradition and precepts of New Jersey law, was antithetical to federal precedent. Id. The justice examined the United
States Supreme Court's pronouncement in Spaziano v. Florida,
wherein the Court upheld a defendant's conviction for murder,
which was rendered pursuant to jury instructions similar to those
given in Short's trial. Id. (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447
(1984)). According to Justice Handler, the United States
Supreme Court concluded that a defendant's rights are adequately protected where given a choice between including both
the lesser included offenses as well as effects of the statute of limitations in the jury charge, or foregoing the instruction concerning the statute of limitations. Id. at 59, 618 A.2d at 322. The
majority explicitly rejected Spaziano and held that a defendant's
rights should not be so abridged. Id.
Further, wrote the justice, there exists a crucial distinction
between Spaziano and the case at bar due to the differing role of
the judge and jury under Florida law, where Spaziano first arose,
and under New Jersey law. Id. The justice explained that in Florida, the judge apprises the jury of the punishments attendant to
each crime it is considering for a given defendant, whereas in
New Jersey the jury is limited to determining whether or not the
defendant is guilty. Id. Justice Handler concluded that this subtle but important distinction masks the true problem with the
Court's reasoning in Spaziano, and leads to the cornerstone of the
majority's reasoning in Short. Id. at 60, 618 A.2d at 323.
The justice opined that the root of the court's logic lies in
evaluating the jury's role in the New Jersey legal system. Id. In
New Jersey, the majority noted, the court can not participate in
any process that abridges a defendant's right to a fair trial by
forcing that defendant to surrender the vested right to lesser included offenses at the expense of the statute of limitations. Id.
The jury's ultimate role in the state's criminal justice system, declared the justice, is to determine whether the prosecution has
proven the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
(quoting State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 553, 601 A.2d 175 (1992) (Han-

dler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The justice
asserted that the judiciary must be ardent in its attempts to guide
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the jury deliberations without any potential bias either for or
against the defendant. Id.
The majority emphasized that for the court, this role often
entails careful discrimination between different types of information to ensure that nothing unnecessary to the determination of
culpability reaches the jury. Id. at 60-61, 618 A.2d 323. The
court observed that this limitation extends to jury instructions,
when the presiding judge is obligated to force the jury to base its
conclusions of whether the defendant is guilty singularly upon
evidence properly presented before it, without regard to potential punishment, as this task is not properly within the scope of
the jury in the New Jersey justice system. Id. at 61, 618 A.2d at
323 (citation omitted). Justice Handler recognized that knowledge of attendant punishment may influence a case's outcome,
and that the avoidance of such an occurrence demands that such
information be kept from a jury. Id. at 62, 618 A.2d at 323-34.
The justice explained that it is the trial court's duty to inform the
jury to the extent necessary to form a judgment of culpability,
and not one regarding punishment. Id., 618 A.2d at 324.
Justice Handler then acknowledged that the Wisconsin
Supreme Court resolved in a similar manner the same issue. Id.
(quoting State v. Muentner, 406 N.W.2d at 420 (1987)). Echoing
the Wisconsin Supreme Court's reasoning in that case, the justice
emphasized that the defendant's rights, flowing from both
prosecutorial protection afforded by the statute of limitations
and from juror latitude afforded by instructions on lesser included offenses, are independent and not mutually exclusive. Id.
(quoting Muentner, 406 N.W.2d at 420). Justice Handler concluded that the expiration of a statute of limitations would prevent a jury from entering a judgment of conviction based on a
finding of culpability, but would not prevent ajury from reaching
that verdict. Id. (quoting Muentner, 406 N.W.2d at 421).
In conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme Court illustrated its
reasoning by stating that the jury instruction correctly contained
the lesser included manslaughter offenses and correctly preserved the benefit of the expired statute of limitation for those
offenses, but wrongly included the ramifications of a finding of
guilty as per those offenses due to the expiration of the statute of
limitations. Id. In accordance with its holding that the defendant
was entitled to a jury instruction unencumbered by the sentencing ramifications of a finding of guilt of lesser included manslaughter charges, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the
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appellate division's affirmation of the trial court decision, and remanded the case to the law division. Id.
Justice O'Hern, joined by Justices Garibaldi and Stein, concurred with the majority judgment for a new trial, but dissented
from the majority's holding that the defendant was entitled to
jury instructions free from inclusion of the consequences of a
finding of guilt for manslaughter. Id. at 67, 618 A.2d at 326
(O'Hern, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
O'Hern focused on the dilemma created by the conflicting
desires to allow a jury to hear all of a defendant's relevant defenses while maintaining both prosecutorial integrity and the
jury's perception of its importance to the justice system. Id. at
63, 618 A.2d 324 (O'Hern, concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Justice O'Hern wrote that the majority was overly concerned
with preventing the trial court from confronting the jury with the
choice of convicting a defendant charged with a more serious
crime or not convicting at all. Id. This concern, opined the justice, comes at the expense of the risk that a similar jury given the
opportunity to convict a defendant of a lesser included offense
might do so out of compassion, only to result in an acquittal due
to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. Justice O'Hern
emphasized that the result of declining to instruct ajury as to the
sentencing ramifications of a guilty charge on an offense whose
statute of limitations has expired is that the confidence of the
public in the administration of the judicial system is severely curtailed. Id. As did the appellate division, the minority opinion refused to participate in what it characterized as an effort by the
defendant to force the courts to sanction judicial deceit and trickery. Id. at 64, 618 A.2d at 325 (O'Hern, concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
The minority opinion asserted that, contrary to the majority's implication, the jury instruction dilemma was not insoluble.
Id. Justice O'Hern referenced several circumstances wherein the
court instructs the jury to consider certain offenses while attempting to execute judgment on a different charge, despite an
inability to return binding verdicts on those offenses. Id. (citations omitted). In those situations, the justice opined, the court
trusts the jury to follow those instructions, and not to allow any
evaluation concerning punishment to enter into the final determination of criminal culpability. Id. at 65, 618 A.2d 325
(O'Hern, concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, as-
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serted Justice O'Hern, the dilemma is solved by carefully instructing the jury concerning its functions and trusting the jury to
discharge its function responsibly and according to the instructions given. Id. at 66, 618 A.2d at 326 (O'Hern, concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
Justice O'Hern characterized this case as transitional, insofar
as the New Jersey Legislature had, after Short's trial, removed all
time bars for manslaughter offenses. Id. In light of the legislative action, the justice postulated, the defendant should be given
the option of waiving the statute of limitations and having the
jury deliberate on the lesser included offenses, or retaining the
statute of limitations and foregoing a charge on the lesser included offenses. Id. In either event, the justice articulated, the
defendant is not entitled to both rights in light of the potential
for an acquittal following a determination of guilt on the manslaughter charges. Id. In this case, the justice contended, the
jury instructions should include murder and the lesser included
offenses of manslaughter, as well as the ramifications of the expiration for the statute of limitations for manslaughter. Id. at 65,
618 A.2d at 325 (O'Hern, concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice O'Hern propounded that the trial court should include with these instructions an admonition to the jury that if the
evidence does not support a conviction of murder, it should not
convict the defendant on those grounds. Id.
With respect to defendant Short, however, Justice O'Hern
explained that the trial court judge's instructions were misleading in that they emphasized the role of the statute of limitations,
rather than the defendant's right to have a jury consider all
charges supported by the evidence, as the cause of an acquittal
for the murder charge. Id. at 66-67, 618 A.2d at 326 (O'Hern,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Additionally, the justice wrote that it would be unfair to allow the trial court conviction to stand given the uncertainty surrounding the rule of law on
this issue at the outset of this case. Id. at 66, 618 A.2d 326
(O'Hern, concurring in part and dissenting in part). The justice
continued that the trial court's jury instructions compounded the
uncertainty surrounding the rule of law on this issue at the outset
of this case. Id. As suchJustice O'Hern, joined by Justices Garibaldi and Stein, concurred with the majority to require a new
trial, but dissented from the majority opinion sanctioning a jury
instruction without reference to the expiration of the statute of
limitations as grounds for acquittal on a finding of guilt for man-
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slaughter. Id. at 67, 618 A.2d at 326 (O'Hern, concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
In New Jersey, the responsibilities of each participant in the
resolution of a criminal case are clearly delineated. The legislature proscribes the appropriate punishment for a crime, the jury
determines whether in fact and in law that crime has been committed by the defendant in question, and the judiciary oversees
the proceedings to ensure fairness and impose the punishment
prescribed by the legislature. The majority in Short wisely decided not to upset this balance.
Justice Handler limited the judicial consideration of jury instructions to whether there was a rational basis in the evidence
for an acquittal on the greater offense and a conviction on the
lesser charge. In so doing, the justice bound the jury as closely
as possible to its constitutionally ordained duty to determine the
criminal culpability of a peer. The judge need not instruct the
jury concerning the effect of the expiration of the statute of limitations on the offenses that the jury is considering, because that
information is irrelevant to the defendant's culpability. The passage of time between the commission of a crime and an indictment for a crime does not alter the defendant's role in the event.
As the jury must determine the defendant's role, its consideration of the statute of limitations serves no valid function, and,
therefore, is correctly excluded from consideration.
The statute of limitations encourages the prompt investigation and prosecution of criminal cases, preserves the integrity of
the criminal justice system, and protects the defendant from having to protect against stale claims. As the majority astutely
noted, the expiration of a statutory period in a criminal case assumes even greater import because the defendant's liberty hangs
in the balance. The dissent in Short devalued these truths in an
admirable effort to preserve the public's trust and confidence in
the workings of the criminal justice system.
From the outset of a trial, the jury is acutely aware that its
role is to determine guilt, not set punishment. The separation of
these functions is crucial because it eliminates from deliberation
the subjectivity of individual jurors' perceptions of the appropriate punishments for certain crimes, while appropriately restricting the jury's role to determining whether or not the defendant is
guilty. The dissent, although laudably concerned with jurors'
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perceptions of the criminal justice system's fairness, failed to see
the value in perpetuating this distinction.
Eric Abraham

